The theory of natural dualities is a general theory of Stone-Priestley-type categorical dualities based on the machinery of universal algebra. Such dualities play a fundamental role in recent developments of coalgebraic logic. At the same time, however, natural duality theory has not subsumed important dualities in coalgebraic logic, including Jónsson-Tarski's topological duality and Abramsky-Kupke-Kurz-Venema's coalgebraic duality for the class of all modal algebras. By introducing a new notion of ISP M , in this paper, we aim to extend the theory of natural dualities so that it encompasses Jónsson-Tarski duality and Abramsky-Kupke-Kurz-Venema duality. The main results are topological and coalgebraic dualities for ISP M (L) where L is a semi-primal algebra with a bounded lattice reduct. These dualities are shown building upon Keimel-Werner's semi-primal duality theorem. Our general theory subsumes both Jónsson-Tarski and AbramskyKupke-Kurz-Venema dualities. Moreover, it provides new coalgebraic dualities for algebras of many-valued modal logics and certain insights into a category-equivalence problem for categories of algebras involved. It also follows from our dualities that the corresponding categories of coalgebras have final coalgebras and cofree coalgebras. ISP M provides a natural framework for the universal algebra of modalities, and as such, for the theory of modal natural dualities.
Introduction
By proposing a new notion of ISP M as the modalization of ISP, in this paper, we attempt to extend the theory of natural dualities (see [10, 37] ) so that it encompasses Jónsson-Tarski's topological duality (see [24, 5, 17, 19] ) and Abramsky-Kupke-Kurz-Venema's coalgebraic duality (see [2, 26] ) for the class of all modal algebras. Such dualities play a fundamental role in recent developments of coalgebraic logic (see [9] ), which allows us to unify different kinds of modal logics, based on the theory of coalgebras.
A typical story in coalgebraic logic is as follows (see [27] ). A dual adjunction induced by a schizophrenic object (see [39] ) represents the syntax and semantics of a propositional logic (some researchers call such an adjunction a logical connection; see [28] ). The Stone adjunction between Boolean algebras and sets is a typical example of this. We then fix an endofunctor on one category in the dual adjunction, which in turn induces an endofunctor on the other. The algebras and coalgebras of the endofunctors give rise to the syntax and semantics of the propositional logic equipped with modality. In particular, the standard modal logic K and Kripke semantics arise from the Stone adjunction by taking the power-set functor as an endofunctor on sets. Many modal logics such as monotone modal logic and probabilistic modal logic fall into this picture. In "good" cases, we can finally obtain duality between the corresponding algebras and coalgebras, as we are able to lead from Stone duality to Abramsky-Kupke-Kurz-Venema duality via Jónsson-Tarski duality.
In relation to this picture of coalgebraic logic, we start with Keimel-Werner's semi-primal duality theorem (see [10, Theorem 3.3.14] and [25] ) in natural duality theory. Keimel-Werner's theorem is a universal-algebraic generalization of Stone duality for Boolean algebras and can be seen as dual adjunctions induced by schizophrenic objects, representing the syntax and semantics of propositional logics. Our aim is then to establish the corresponding Jónsson-Tarski-type duality and Abramsky-Kupke-Kurz-Venema-type duality by introducing the new notion of ISP M . At least under the assumption of semi-primality, categories arising from ISP M can be considered as categories of algebras for certain "free-generation" endofunctors on categories obtained via ISP, and the duals of categories induced by ISP M can be described as categories of coalgebras for certain "Vietoris-style" endofunctors on the duals of categories corresponding to ISP.
In the following, let us first review an aspect of natural duality theory and a certain difficulty in incorporating into it Jónsson-Tarski duality and Abramsky-Kupke-Kurz-Venema duality for the class of all modal algebras. We shall then see that the difficulty can be overcome with the help of ISP M .
The theory of natural dualities by Davey et al. is a powerful general theory of Stone-Priestleytype dualities based on the machinery of universal algebra. It basically considers duality theory for ISP(M ) where M is a finite algebra. It is useful for obtaining new dualities and actually encompasses many known dualities, including Stone duality for Boolean algebras (see [42] ), Priestley duality for distributive lattices (see [40] ), and Cignoli duality for MV n -algebras, i.e., algebras of Lukasiewicz n-valued logic (see [8, 35] ), to name but a few (for more instances, see [10, 37] ).
At the same time, however, it has not encompassed Jónsson-Tarski duality or Abramsky-KupkeKurz-Venema duality for the class of all modal algebras, any of which is important in coalgebraic logic. We consider that this is mainly because the class of all modal algebras cannot be expressed as ISP(M ) for a finite algebra M , in contrast to the fact that any of the class of Boolean algebras, the class of distributive lattices, and the class of MV n -algebras can be expressed as ISP(M ) for a suitable finite algebra M .
We should note here that, given a modal algebra, the Boolean operations of the function algebra on its spectrum (i.e., the space of prime filters) can be defined pointwise, while only the modal operation of the function algebra cannot be defined pointwise (recall that it is defined depending on the canonical relation induced by the modal operation of the original modal algebra). In a nutshell, modality is not a pointwise operation unlike the other Boolean operations. For the very reason, the class of all modal algebras cannot be expressed as ISP(M ) (all the operations of A ∈ ISP(M ) are pointwise by definition), and we have to pay a special attention to modality when developing natural duality theory for algebras with modal operations. We remark that the same thing can be said also for the implication operation of a Heyting algebra, which is not pointwise (on the spectrum of the Heyting algebra). And this actually tells us a duality-theoretic reason why Gödel failed to capture intuitionistic logic as a many-valued logic (broadly speaking, ISP(M ) amounts to algebras of M -valued logic).
In this paper, we introduce a new notion of ISP M in order to extend the theory of natural dualities so that it encompasses Jónsson-Tarski's topological duality and Abramsky-Kupke-KurzVenema's coalgebraic duality. It is crucial here that the class of all modal algebras coincides with
The Notion of ISP M
For universal algebra and lattice theory, we refer the reader to [7, 11] . For category theory, we refer to [4] , which contains categorical universal algebra and categorical universal topology (especially, categorical Birkhoff theorems and its topological analogues).
Throughout this paper, let L denote a finite algebra with a bounded lattice reduct (it is natural from a logical point of view to suppose the existence of a bounded lattice reduct, since most logics are equipped with the lattice connectives ∧ and ∨ and the truth constants 0 and 1). Let 2 denote the two-element Boolean algebra.
From a logical point of view, we may see L as an algebra of truth values. Since the lattice reduct of L turns out to be a complete Heyting algebra (note that any finite distributive lattice is a Heyting algebra), the lattice reduct of L is actually a so-called truth-value object Ω in an elementary topos. The case that L = 2 amounts to classical logic, and ISP(2) coincides with the class of all Boolean algebras.
We define the notion of modal power as follows. For a set S, L S denotes the set of all functions from S to L. A Kripke frame is defined as a tuple (S, R) such that S is a non-empty set and R is a binary relation on S.
Definition 2.1. For a Kripke frame (S, R), the modal power of L with respect to
(S, R) is defined as L S ∈ ISP(L) equipped with a unary operation R on L S defined by ( R f )(w) = ∧ {f (w ) ; wRw } where f ∈ L S and w ∈ S. Then,
a modal power of L is defined as the modal power of L with respect to (S, R) for some Kripke frame (S, R). (To be precise about the order of quantifiers, this means that, for any modal power A of L, there is some Kripke frame (S, R) such that A is a modal power of L with respect to (S, R).)
For a Kripke frame (S, R), let L (S,R) denote the modal power of L with respect to (S, R). The notion of ISP M is then defined as follows.
Definition 2.2. ISP M (L) denotes the class of all isomorphic copies of subalgebras of modal powers of L.
We often denote by (A, ) an element of
Definition 2.3. ISP(L) denotes the category of algebras in ISP(L) and homomorphisms where a homomorphism is defined as a function which preserves all the operations of L. ISP M (L) denotes the category of algebras in ISP M (L) and modal homomorphisms where a modal homomorphism is defined as a function which preserves and all the operations of L.
The modalization of ISP preserves the closedness under I, S, and P as follows. Proof. It is clear that ISP M (L) is closed under I and S. In order to show that it is closed under direct products, let I be a set and (A i , i ) ∈ ISP M (L) for i ∈ I. Then it follows that for each i ∈ I there is a Kripke frame (
, the modal power of L with respect to (S i , R i ). Define a Kripke frame (S, R) by
. To show this, we define a function e :
as follows. Given x ∈ S and f i :
where k is the unique j ∈ I such that x ∈ S j . Let denote the modal operation of
It also holds that if
Thus, we have shown that e preserves . It is straightforward to see that e also preserves the other operations of
According to the theory of free algebras in universal algebra, the above proposition gives us the following. 
, and any x ∈ A, the following holds:
The Kripke condition may be considered as completeness in logical terms. In this paper, the Kripke condition can be seen as a condition on L rather than ISP M (L), since we concentrate on "normal" modal logic induced by L. If we also consider other types of modal logics, however, it seems that ISP M is not a unique way to generate the corresponding classes of modal algebras (in the wider sense). In that case, the Kripke condition depends on the way of generating modal algebras as well as the basic structure L.
The notions of ISP M and Kripke condition are motivated by Proposition 2.8 and Proposition 2.10 below. Proof. By Jónsson-Tarski representation (see, e.g., [5, Theorem 5.43] ), any modal algebra can be embedded into a modal power of 2. It is straightforward to see that any A ∈ ISP M (2) is a modal algebra. Thus, ISP M (2) coincides with the class of all modal algebras. It follows from Proposition 3.14 below that ISP M (2) satisfies the Kripke condition (a direct proof of this fact can also be given in a similar way to the completeness proof of classical modal logic K).
The algebra n of truth values in Lukasiewicz n-valued logic is defined as follows (see, e.g., [18] ): Definition 2.9. Let n denote {0, 1/(n − 1), ..., (n − 2)/(n − 1), 1} equipped with the operations
An MMV n -algebra introduced in [44, Definition 3.1] is an algebra of Lukasiewicz n-valued modal logic. We then have the following. Proof. By Teheux representation following from [44, Theorem 4.11] , any MMV n -algebra can be embedded into a modal power of n. It is straightforward to see that any A ∈ ISP M (n) is an MMV n -algebra. Thus, ISP M (2) coincides with the class of all modal algebras. It follows from Proposition 3.14 below that ISP M (n) satisfies the Kripke condition (or this also follows from the completeness of Lukasiewicz n-valued modal logic).
A similar proposition can be shown also for L-ML-algebras, which are algebras of a version of Fitting's many-valued modal logic (see [29, 32] ).
Thus, the notion of ISP M seems to be natural and useful.
Modal Semi-Primal Duality Theorem
In the remaining part of the paper, we assume that L is semi-primal. A semi-primal algebra is a useful concept in universal algebra and is defined as follows. Intuitively, we may say that a conservative function on an algebra is a function preserving the subalgebra structure of the algebra. For characterizations of semi-primality and term-definable operations on semi-primal algebras, we refer the reader to [38, 12] .
We remark that, under the assumption of the semi-primality of L, ISP M (L) actually forms a variety (or a monadic category in categorical terms), which shall be shown in a subsequent paper on the finite axiomatizability of ISP(L) and ISP M (L).
Now it is straightforward to verify the following lemmas by cheking that each function is conservative.
The function q : L 4 → L is called the quaternary discriminator.
To verify the proposition above, note that any subalgebra of L contains constants 0 and 1 by the definition of a subalgebra.
From a logical point of view, T a (p) intuitively means that the truth value of a proposition p is exactly a for an element a of the algebra L of truth values, which may be seen as a truth-value object in a topos, since the lattice reduct of L is a complete Heyting algebra.
We can also define the function U a : L → L by using T a in the following way:
It is straightforward to see that U a and ∧ are commutative, i.e.,
Moreover, and U a are commutative, i.e.,
for any x ∈ A where (A, ) ∈ ISP M (L). This can be verified using the fact that U a and ∧ are commutative (note that is defined via ∧). We also remark that U 1 (x) = T 1 (x).
We can apply Keimel-Werner's semi-primal duality theorem [10, Theorem 3.3.14] to obtain a topological duality for ISP(L), which is explained in the following subsection. We shall later build a duality theory for ISP M (L) based on the semi-primal duality theorem.
Semi-primal duality for ISP(L)
Let SubAlg(L) denote the set of all subalgebras of L. For a Boolean space S, let SubSp(S) denote the set of all closed subspaces of S, where a Boolean space means a zero-dimensional compact Hausdorff space.
Definition 3.6. We define a category BS L . An object in BS L is a tuple (S, α) such that S is a
Boolean space and that a function α : SubAlg(L) → SubSp(S) satisfies:
We call a map satisfying the condition a subspace-preserving map.
Having an object in BS L is equivalent to having a meet-preserving function α : SubAlg(L) → SubSp(S). This provides another definition of an object in BS L as a SubAlg(L)-indexed family of Boolean spaces satisfying the condition of meet-preservation.
Note also that the condition 2 above implies that, if
We equip L and its subalgebras with the discrete topologies.
with the topology generated by { x ; x ∈ A} where
Lemma 3.3 and Lemma 3.5.
Definition 3.7.
We define a contravariant functor Spec :
The functor Spec can be defined also for ISP M (L) (by considering modality-free reducts). The domain of Spec is defined to be ISP(L) just because it is an ingredient of duality between ISP(L) and BS L .
Definition 3.8. We define a contravariant functor
equipped with the pointwise operations. For an arrow f :
Later we shall extend Spec and Cont to the modal setting (RSpec and MCont respectively). By Keimel-Werner's semi-primal duality theorem [10, Theorem 3.3.14], we obtain the following. The semi-primal duality theorem is essentially due to [25] . Based on the above duality, we shall show that ISP M (L) is dually equivalent to RBS L , which is defined in Definition 3.15 below. In order to prove this duality, we first verify the Kripke condition for ISP M (L) in the next subsection.
The verification of the Kripke condition
In order to show that ISP M (L) satisfies the Kripke condition, we use the prime filter theorem for Boolean algebras (see, e.g., [23] ). We first introduce the notion of the Boolean core
Proof. This follows from the the two facts that (B(A), ∧, ∨, T 0 , 0, 1) is a subalgebra of a direct power of (B(L), ∧, ∨, T 0 , 0, 1) and that (B(L), ∧, ∨, T 0 , 0, 1) is the two-element Boolean algebra (note that T 0 is the complement operation).
Lemma 3.12. For A ∈ ISP(L), let P be a prime filter of a Boolean algebra B(A). Define
Then it follows by definition that
It is straightforward to show the following inequality (note that it is enough to verify the inequality in L):
Thus we have T t(a 1 ,...,an) (t(x 1 , ..., x n )) ∈ P , which implies that
This completes the proof.
The following lemma is crucial for the verification of the Kripke condition.
Proof. It is easily verified that the left-hand side implies the right-hand side. We show the converse by proving the contrapositive. Assume that v( x) a. This means that v(U a ( x)) = 1. Let
Note that X ⊂ B(A). Let F be the filter of B(A) generated by X.
We claim that U a (x) / ∈ F . Suppose for contradiction that U a (x) ∈ F . Then there is ϕ ∈ A such that ϕ ≤ U a (x) and ϕ is constructed from ∧ and elements of X. Since the equation
By ϕ ≤ U a (x), it follows from the definition of modal power that ϕ ≤ U a (x). We also have
which is a contradiction. Hence, we have U a (x) / ∈ F . By the prime filter theorem for Boolean algebras, there is a prime filter P of B(A) such that F ⊂ P and U a (x) / ∈ P . Define v P : A → L as in Lemma 3.12 and then we have
Since U a (x) / ∈ P and since T 1 (U a (x)) = U a (x), it follows that
To complete the proof, it remains to show that vR v P . By using X ⊂ P , this follows from the fact
By the above lemma we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 3.14. ISP M (L) satisfies the Kripke condition, i.e., for any
The above proposition plays an important role in establishing our duality result.
Category RBS L
For a Kripke frame (S, R) and
is an object in BS L and that a binary relation R on S satisfies:
In order to show a dual equivalence between the categories ISP M (L) and RBS L , we introduce functors RSpec and MCont in the next subsection.
Functors RSpec and MCont

Definition 3.16. We define a contravariant functor
where R is defined in Definition 2.6. For an arrow f :
The well-definedness of RSpec is shown by the following two lemmas.
Proof. By Theorem 3.9, RSpec(A) without R is an object in BS L . We first show that RSpec(A) satisfies item 1 in Definition 3.
Then it follows from Lemma 3.4 and Lemma 3.5 that
We next show that RSpec(A) satisfies item 2 in Definition 3.15. Since R −1 preserves unions of sets and since { x ; x ∈ A} forms a base of the topology of Hom ISP(L) (A, L) (note that it is closed under finite intersections), it suffices to show that R −1 ( x ) is clopen in S for any x ∈ A. We claim that
where ¬ϕ is the abbreviation of ϕ → 0. Note that the right-hand side is clopen. To show the claim, we first assume v ∈ ¬ ¬T 1 (x) . By Lemma 3.5, we have v( ¬T 1 (x)) = 0. Then it follows from the Kripke condition that
Since u(¬T 1 (x)) is either 0 or 1 by Lemma 3.3 and Lemma 3.5, there is u ∈ Hom ISP(L) (A, L) with vR u such that u(¬T 1 (x)) = 0. Then we have u ∈ x . Therefore we conclude v ∈ R −1 ( x ). The converse is similarly proved by using the Kripke condition.
We finally show that RSpec(A) satisfies item 3 in Definition 3.15. Assume for contradiction that u ∈ Hom ISP(L) (A, M ) and
Thus it follows from the Kripke condition and uR v that
The following lemma is shown using the prime filter theorem for Boolean algebras.
Proof. By Theorem 3.9, RSpec(f ) is an arrow in BS L . Thus it remains to show that RSpec(f ) satisfies items 4 and 5 in Definition 3.15. We first verify item 4. For v, u ∈ RSpec(A 2 ), assume (v, u) ∈ R 2 . Then it suffices to show that
To show this, suppose
Let X = X v ∪ X u . We claim that X has the finite intersection property. Suppose for contradiction that X does not have the finite intersection property. Then, since by U a (x) = U 1 (U a (x)) we have
and since U 1 distributes over ∧, there are U 1 (x), f (U 1 (y)) ∈ A 2 such that v( 2 U 1 (x)) = 1, u(U 1 (y)) = 1, and U 1 (x) ≤ ¬f (U 1 (y)) where ¬ϕ is the abbreviation of ϕ → 0. Then we have
By assumption, we have u(¬U 1 (y)) = 1, which contradicts u(U 1 (y)) = 1. Thus X has the finite intersection property. By the prime filter theorem for Boolean algebras, there is a prime filter P of B(A 2 ) such that X ⊂ P . Define v P : A 2 → L as in Lemma 3.12 and then we have
It follows from X v ⊂ P that vR 2 v P . It follows from X u ⊂ P that RSpec(f )(v P ) = u. This completes the proof.
Thus we have shown that RSpec is well defined.
Definition 3.19. We define a contravariant functor MCont : RBS
L → ISP M (L). For an object (S, α, R) in RBS L , define MCont(S, α, R) = (Cont(S, α), R )
(for the definition of R , see Definition 2.1). For an arrow f : (S
The well-definedness of MCont is shown by the following two lemmas.
Lemma 3.20. Let (S, α, R) be an object in RBS
Proof. By Theorem 3.9, MCont(S, α, R) without is in ISP(L). We first verify that R is well defined on MCont(S, α, R), i.e., if f ∈ MCont(S, α, R) then R f ∈ MCont(S, α, R). Let f ∈ MCont(S, α, R). We then have the following: For a ∈ L,
where note that w ∈ R −1 [(T a (f )) −1 (1) ] means that there is w ∈ S such that wRw and f (w ) = a; and w ∈ S \ R −1 [(U a (f )) −1 (0)] means that there is no w ∈ S such that wRw and f (w ) a. Since
is clopen in S, R f is a continuous map from S to L. It follows from the condition 3 in Definition 3.15 that R f is subspace-preserving. Thus we have R f ∈ MCont(S, α, R), whence R is well defined. It follows from the definition of R that MCont(S, α, R) is a subalgebra of a modal power L S of L, whence we have MCont(S, α, R) ∈ ISP M (L).
Lemma 3.21. Let f : (S
Proof. By Theorem 3.9, MCont(f ) is an arrow in ISP(L). It suffices to show that MCont(f )( g 2 ) = (MCont(f )(g 2 )) for g 2 ∈ Cont(S 2 , α 2 ). Let w 1 ∈ S 1 . Then, we have
Let a denote the rightmost side of the above equation. We also have Thus we have shown that MCont is well defined.
Topological duality for ISP M (L)
In this subsection, we show a topological duality for ISP M (L), thus generalizing Jónsson-Tarski duality for modal algebras from the viewpoint of universal algebra.
Theorem 3.22. Let
A ∈ ISP M (L). Then, A is isomorphic to MCont • RSpec(A) in the category ISP M (L).
Proof. Define ε
A : A → MCont • RSpec(A) by ε A (x)(v) = v(x) for x ∈ A and v ∈ Hom ISP(L) (A
, L). It follows from Theorem 3.9 that ε A is an isomorphism in ISP(L).
Thus it remains to show that ε A preserves , i.e., ε A ( x) = R ε A (x) for x ∈ A. For v ∈ RSpec(A), we have the following:
Theorem 3.23. Let (S, α, R) be an object in RBS L . Then, (S, α, R) is isomorphic to RSpec
for x ∈ S and f ∈ Cont(S, α). By Theorem 3.9, η (S,α,R) is an isomorphism in the category BS L . Below, we denote η (S,α,R) by η S . We first show that, for any w, w ∈ S, wRw iff η S (w)R R η S (w ). Recall that the right-hand side holds iff the following condition holds:
Assume that wRw . We verify the above condition. Let a ∈ L and f ∈ Cont(S, α).
The converse is shown as follows. To prove the contrapositive, assume that (w, w ) / ∈ R. It follows from Definition 3. S satisfy item 5 in Definition 3.15. This follows immediately from the facts that wRw iff η S (w)R R η S (w ) and that η S is bijective.
Finally we obtain the modal semi-primal duality theorem. The original Jónsson-Tarski duality can be recovered by letting L be the two-element Boolean algebra in the above theorem.
We have extended Keimel-Werner's semi-primal duality without modality:
ISP(L) BS L op
to the duality with modality:
This was accomplished via the new notion of ISP M , without which it would be difficult to obtain such a modalized analogue of the semi-primal duality theorem.
In the next section, we shall show how to describe the category RBS L in terms of the theory of coalgebras, thus obtaining a coalgebraic description of the duality ISP M (L) RBS L op .
Definition 4.1. Let C be a category and T an endofunctor on C. A T-coalgebra is defined as a tuple (C, δ) for an object C in C and an arrow
δ : C → T(C) in C. For T-coalgebras (C 1 , δ 1 ) and (C 2 , δ 2 ), a T-coalgebra morphism from (C 1 , δ 1 ) to (C 2 , δ 2 ) is defined as an arrow f : C 1 → C 2 in C that satisfies δ 2 • f = T(f ) • δ 1 .
Then, Coalg(T) denotes the category of T-coalgebras and T-coalgebra morphisms.
Let us recall the definition of Vietoris topology. 
The Vietoris space V(S) of S is defined as a topological space whose underlying set is C S and whose topology is generated by
Then we have the following proposition (see [34] ).
Proposition 4.3. If S is a Boolean space, then V(S) is a Boolean space whose topology is generated by the following set of clopen subsets of V(S):
We now introduce the concept of L-Vietoris functor.
Definition 4.4. We define the L-Vietoris
The well-definedness of the L-Vietoris functor is shown by the following two lemmas. We use the notations of Definition 4.2 in the following proofs of them.
Proof. By Proposition 4.3, V(S) is a Boolean space.
We
is a subset of V(S). Since for U ∈ O S we have both
and
is a subspace of V(S). In order to show that V • α(M ) is closed in V(S), assume that F ∈ V(S) and F / ∈ V • α(M ). Then, there is x ∈ F such that x / ∈ α(M ). Since α(M ) is closed in S, D S (S \ α(M )) is open in V(S). Moreover, we have
F ∈ D S (S \ α(M )) and V • α(M ) ∩ D S (S \ α(M )) = ∅.
Hence, V • α(M ) is closed in V(S).
We next show that V•α satisfies the three conditions in Definition 3.6. It follows from α(
for F 1 , F 2 ∈ C S , which follows from the fact that for X ⊂ S we have
Proof. Since f is a continuous map between Boolean spaces, it follows from [13, Theorem 3.1.8] that V L (f ) maps a closed subset of S to a closed subset of S . In order to show that V L (f ) is continuous, let U ∈ O S . Then we have
and also
Hence we have
In order to show that Coalg(V L ) is isomorphic to RBS L , we introduce two functors RC and CR between the two categories. α) is an arrow in BS L by items 1, 2 and 3 in Definition 3.15 and by Proposition 4.3. It is straightforward to verify that RC(f ) is an arrow in Coalg(V L ) for an arrow f in RBS L . Thus, the functor RC is well defined.
Definition 4.7. A functor RC : RBS
L → Coalg(V L ) is defined as follows. For an object (S, α, R) in RBS L , RC(S, α, R) is defined as a V L -coalgebra ((S, α), R[-]) where R[-] : (S, α) → V L (S, α) is defined by R[x] = {y ∈ S ; xRy} for x ∈ S. For an arrow f in RBS L , define RC(f ) = f . In the above definition, RC(S, α, R) is a V L -coalgebra, since R[-] : (S, α) → V L (S,
Definition 4.8. A functor
where a binary relation R δ on S is defined by
The well-definedness of the functor CR is shown by the following lemma.
Proof. It suffices to show that (S, α, R δ ) satisfies the three conditions in Definition 3.15. First, for
is a closed subset of V(S). Second, for a clopen subset O of S, the following holds:
Since S is a Boolean space, this implies that R δ is a continuous map from S to
δ is subspace-preserving by definition). This completes the proof.
It is straightforward to verify that CR(f ) is an arrow in RBS
Thus we obtain the following theorem. 
Proof. Clearly we have CR
Thus, (S, α, R) is exactly the same as CR • RC(S, α, R). Let ((S, α), δ) be an object in Coalg(V L ). Then we have:
Thus, ((S, α), δ) is exactly the same as RC • CR((S, α), δ).
By Theorem 3.24 and Theorem 4.10, we obtain the following coalgebraic duality theorem, which generalizes Abramsky-Kupke-Kurz-Venema duality for modal algebras from the viewpoint of universal algebra. RBS L op can be described in terms of the theory of coalgebras. Abramsky-Kupke-Kurz-Venema duality can be recovered by letting L be the two-element Boolean algebra in the above theorem.
Since ISP M (n) coincides with the class of all MMV n -algebras and since n forms a semi-primal algebra with a lattice reduct, the above theorem gives us a coalgebraic duality for MMV n -algebras (i.e., algebras of Lukasiewicz n-valued modal logic):
Corollary 4.12. The category of MMV n -algebras and their homomorphisms is dually equivalent to Coalg(V n ).
In a similar way, we obtain a coalgebraic duality for L-ML-algebras (i.e., algebras of a version of Fitting's many-valued modal logic). We remark that [30, Lemma 2.6] is useful when proving that n is semi-primal (this can be shown in a similar way to [32, Lemma 2.3] via [30, Lemma 2.6] ).
With the help of Corollary 2.5 and Theorem 4.11, we obtain the following.
Corollary 4.13. Coalg(V L ) has cofree coalgebras.
Since ISP M (L) has the initial algebra, we obtain the final coalgebra theorem for V L .
Corollary 4.14. The endofunctor V L has a final coalgebra.
If L is not only semi-primal but also primal (for its definition, see [10] ), then by Hu theorem (see [10, 
Conclusions and Future Work
We have introduced the new notion of ISP M and extended the theory of natural dualities so as to encompass Jónsson-Tarski duality and Abramsky-Kupke-Kurz-Venema duality for the class of all modal algebras, which are becoming more and more important in coalgebraic logic. Whereas ISP(M ) cannot be the class of all modal algebras, crucially, ISP M (2) coincides with the class of all modal algebras, and furthermore, there are similar facts for algebras of many-valued modal logics.
ISP M thus provides a natural framework for the universal algebra of modalities, and as such, for the theory of modal natural dualities. From a technical point of view, our starting point was Keimel-Werner's semi-primal duality for ISP(L) in natural duality theory. Having shifted our focus from ISP(L) to ISP M (L), we verified the Kripke condition for ISP M (L) where L is a semi-primal algebra with a bounded lattice reduct. The Kripke condition is completeness in logical terms, and we needed a weaker form of the axiom of choice for the verification of it. As main results, we obtained topological and coalgebraic dualities for ISP M (L) with three kinds of applications of them: coalgebraic dualities for many-valued modal logics; the existence of a final coalgebra and cofree coalgebras in Coalg(V L ); and a criterion for the equivalence of categories of the form ISP M (L).
We conclude the paper by mentioning several future directions of research and by placing Stone duality in a wider context of the interaction between mathematics and philosophy.
Firstly, it would be fruitful to generalize the notion of ISP M from the viewpoint of coalgebraic logic, since a number of modal logics (e.g., monotone modal logic and graded modal logic) can be described in coalgebraic terms. This is expected to allow us to develop natural duality theory for coalgebraic modal logics. Now, how can we generalize ISP M to a coalgebraic-logical setting? Let us begin with an endofunctor T : Set → Set and fix a function ♥ : T (L n ) → L where n ∈ ω and L is an algebra (possibly with some conditions on T, ♥, L). Then, given a T -coalgebra δ : X → T (X), we can define an n-ary modal operation on Hom Set (X, L) by
where f is considered as an element of Another important direction of research would be to establish an intuitionistic analogue of the theory presented in this paper, which involves a universal-algebraic generalization of Esakia duality for Heyting algebras. First of all, the class of all Heyting algebras cannot be expressed as ISP(L) for any single algebra L. As already mentioned in Section 1, this is nothing but a duality-theoretic expression of the reason why Gödel failed to capture intuitionistic logic as a many-valued logic. Hence we have to consider a new way to generate a class of algebras. Given an intuitionistic frame (X, ≤), we can define an implication operation →:
In this way, we obtain the concept of an intuitionistic power of L and so the concept of ISP I (L) i.e., the class of isomorphic copies of subalgebras of intuitionistic powers of L. We can show that, for the two-element distributive lattice 2, ISP I (2) coincides with the class of all Heyting algebras and that, for n without → or ¬, ISP I (n) coincides with the class of all algebras of intuitionistic Lukasiewicz n-valued logic (which is naturally defined via n-valued Kripke semantics). In future work, we will attempt to develop natural duality theory for ISP I (L), in order to make it possible to incorporate Esakia duality for Heyting algebras into the theory of natural dualities. At the same time, however, we have to remark that there is a different perspective on intuitionistic logic, i.e., we can see it as distributive lattices with residuation or the right adjoints of meets. This point of view leads us to the notion of IS R P, and IS R P(2) coincides with the class of all Heyting algebras. Although we do not describe a precise definition here, S R (M ) is the class of "residuated" subalgebras of a given ordered algebra M . Interestingly, it does not hold in general that ISP I (M ) = IS R P(M ). Hence, the two perspectives on intuitionistic logic (i.e., the former, Kripke-semantics-based one and the latter, residuation-based one) are really different in that sense. While natural duality theory is based on universal algebra and general topology (possibly with relational structures), which are of set-theoretical character, we can also develop duality theory building upon category theory, especially categorical algebra and categorical topology (see [4] ). Because universal algebra is well developed for finitary algebras (though not for infinitary ones), we consider that natural duality theory is suitable for "finitary Stone-type dualities", by which we mean Stone-type dualities concerning finitary operations and so compact spectrums. On the other hand, the theory of monads, which is categorical universal algebra, naturally encompass infinitary algebras such as frames (or locales) and continuous lattices (both are the EilenbergMoore algebras of certain monads). Accordingly, categorical duality theories (see, e.g., [33, 39] ) seem suitable for "infinitary Stone-type dualities", a typical example of which is Isbell-Papert's dual adjunction between frames and topological spaces. Note that finitary Stone-type dualies often require a weaker form of the axiom of choice, whereas infinitary ones sometimes avoid such a nondeterministic principle, as is the case in Isbell-Papert duality or duality between point-free spaces and point-set spaces in general (see [31, 33] ).
Categorical duality theories (including those cited above) are usually more general than natural duality theory, subsuming both finitary and infinitary ones. At the same time, however, they are less substantial than natural duality theory, especially in the sense that they often lack the "adequate" treatment of dual equivalences. Category theory can lead us to dual adjunctions in a significant way, but not to dual equivalences. Although there is a mechanical way to derive equivalences from adjunctions, it is quite trivial, and, at the moment, there appears to be no general, substantial way to do it categorically as [39, p.102] says (roughly, categories A i and B i below amount to trivial descriptions of a dual equivalence derived from a given dual adjunction):
The main task for establishing a duality in a concrete situation is now to identify A i and B i . This can be a very hard problem, and this is where categorical guidance comes to an end.
The real issue thus lies in providing substantial characterizations of A i and B i . In contrast to this situation in categorical duality theories, natural duality theory does yield non-trivial descriptions of A i and B i involved, thus revealing how dual equivalences can be developed in various concrete situations. We consider that this is an important strength of natural duality theory, gained by restricting its scope more than categorical duality theories. By focusing on less general situations, natural duality theory succeeds in giving a more nuanced understanding of Stone duality.
Finally, we briefly touch upon the fundamental question: why do we study Stone duality (in a wider sense) at all? Stone-type dualites are theoretically elegant, and there would be no doubt that they are highly beneficial in practice, since they have indeed had numerous applications in logic, mathematics, and computer science. This is not what we really want to say here, however. Facing the question, we dare to say that Stone duality is duality between human knowledge and the reality of the world, or duality between epistemology and ontology, the two fundamental disciplines of philosophy. This nature of Stone duality is particularly striking in the case of duality between point-set spaces and point-free spaces, as points are ontological ingredients of the notion of space, and regions (or properties of space) are its epistemological ingredients (for more details, see [33] ).
The idea of Stone duality as duality between ontology and epismotelogy is not merely a philosophical doctrine, but also a crucial notion lurking behind practical applications of Stone duality. For example, the main idea of [1] was to see Stone duality as duality between observable properties and denotational meanings of computational processes. Obviously, observable properties of computational processes are human knowledge in the context of computer science, and their denotational meanings are a matter of reality and not that of human knowledge (of course, computational processes are the "world" in computer science; we do not necessarily mean this real world by "world").
Duality between algebras and coalgebras, including those relevant to this paper, may also be considered as an expression of duality between the epistemological and the ontological, via the idea of coalgebraic logic that coalgebras represent some sort of systems (e.g., computer systems) and algebras the (observable) properties of them. Here recall that usually we can only know about computer systems through their (observable) properties; evidently, the former is on the side of reality, and the latter on the side of our knowledge. Broadly speaking, most Stone-type dualities in mathematical logic are expressions of duality between syntax and semantics, which is in turn a specific kind of duality between the epistemological and the ontological.
Such a dichotomy (or duality) between epistemological and ontological things or perspectives can actually be observed in a much broader context, and so is the relation of the epistemological with the ontological. We mention only one case here. Kitaro Nishida, a philosopher of the Kyoto School, considered experience as having a person, rather than a person as having experience, saying (see [36] ):
Over time I came to realize that it is not that experience exists because there is an individual, but that an individual exists because there is experience.
That is, a person is (or at least may be identified with) a bundle of experiences, which is conceived of as being more primary than the notion of a person, in the Nishida philosophy. Its family resemblance to point-free geometry could be clarified in analogy with the leading idea of point-free geometry that a point is a bundle of shrinking regions (or certain properties of space).
Philosophical dichotomies can evolve into mathematical (categorical) dualities, as the case of point-free geometry shows. Indeed, foundational ideas of point-free geometry were first proposed by philosophers including Whitehead and Husserl, and then they were implemented in mathematical fashions, giving rise to categorical dualites between point-free spaces and point-set spaces as mentioned above. It would thus be fruitful to pursuit categorical dualities corresponding to given philosophical dichotomies, which may even have practical impacts as Stone duality was applied to computer science.
With such evidence in mind, we believe that Stone duality can form a sgnificant theme of philosophy as well as mathematics. From the viewpoint of the history of ideas, it would also be worth noting that the 20th century was the time when the emphasis drastically shifted from the ontological to the epistemological in diverse disciplines, ranging from mathematics (e.g., noncommutative geometry), to physics (e.g., algebraic quantum field theory), to computer science (e.g., domain theory in logical form; logic in general is of such nature), and to philosophy (e.g., the theory of meaning; we wonder if we could add phenomenology here).
